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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

State Dept. review completed


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7 August 1964

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS



for independence. (Page 10)

- 8. Italy: Parliament confirms Moro government. (Page 12)
- 9. Notes: Rumania-USSR; Lebanon; Libya. (Page 13)

Next 12 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Southern Rhodesia: Prime Minister Ian Smith's right-wing government has again set a deadline for declaring Southern Rhodesia independent.

According to Sir Roy Welensky, last prime minister of the defunct Rhodesian Federation and a leading behind-the-scenes opponent of Smith's Rhodesian Front party, the Front now plans to act no later than the British elections in mid-October. Smith backed away from an earlier deadline last month, but pressure inside the party has forced him to resume the independence drive.

Welensky says he plans to organize a new party in the next few days to combat Smith. He will have an uphill fight, however, because the whites, who dominate the electoral rolls, strongly support independence.

If Smith does declare the territory independent, his security forces can probably keep the 3,800,000 Africans under control. However, a government in exile would be set up by African nationalists and supported by most of the independent African states. At the same time, an independent Southern Rhodesia might draw closer to South Africa, thus sharpening the lines between African-controlled and white-settler areas.

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*Italy: Parliament confirmed the Moro government last night.

This action reflects a majority consensus that collaboration between Socialists and Christian Democrats provides the only potential for a stable and progressive government.

The new government faces grave economic problems which make particularly difficult its commitment to dissipate the serious popular malaise caused by the failure of previous governments to modernize Italian institutions. The coalition leaders seem to be in agreement regarding corrective measures and appear determined to generate popular support for their program.

A majority within the coalition parties recognizes the necessity of giving economic stabilization priority over social and economic reforms. This necessity, however, will be exploited for political ends by CD conservatives—including President Segni—who strongly oppose the reform goals of center—left cooperation. They will probably attempt to extend the stabilization effort for as long as possible in order to prevent progress on reforms, thus causing the center—left to be ineffective and its concept to be discredited.

The Socialist party will be under pressure from its left wing--which opposes the present program--to speed up the timetable for reforms. The policies of both parties will be clarified and possibly modified at the national congresses currently planned for this fall.

| If the center-left delays too long or is unable to | | |
|---|--|--|
| achieve a public image as a vigorous reform-minded gov- | | |
| ernment, it seems certain that ensuing political develop- | | |
| ments will cause the democratic center and left forces to | | |
| lose significant popular support to the Communists and | | |
| the extreme right. | | |
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NOTES

Rumania-USSR: Rumanian Premier Maurer's early July trip to Moscow resulted in a toning down of public Soviet-Rumanian polemics, but apparently failed to produce agreement on the next step in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Ranking Rumanian officials state Podgorny's hasty visit on 27-28 July was intended to pressure Bucharest into an immediate response to the Soviet proposal for a preparatory meeting of Communist states.

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Podgorny failed during this mission to prevent the circulation of a Rumanian party memorandum to other Eastern European parties

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describing its differences with the USSR.

□Lebanon: Lebanese politicians remain deadlocked over the presidential succession. President Shihab, who last month indicated privately that he was "available" for a second term, has now reaffirmed to the US ambassador that he is determined to step down at the end of his present term on 23 September, "come what may." "Loyalist" elements who want to keep him in office have not given up hope, however, and are still contesting with "oppositionists" for control of parliament, where the issue is supposed to be resolved legally by 23 August.

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Libya: The Libyan Government evidently is preparing to exert further pressure to get the US to agree in principle to evacuate Wheelus air base. The Libyan press, which the government has muzzled in the past few months, this week opened a sharp new attack on the US position. This campaign will again bring the issue to public attention, and will be cited by Libyan officials as evidence of strong popular feeling behind their demands.

THE PRESIDENT

Executive Offices of the White House

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The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

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The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

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